testtest

The Noble (but Doomed) M551 Sheridan in Vietnam

The M551 never fired a shot in anger in Desert Storm/Shield. It's presence was more of a "fleet in being" that did not influence the fight. No Sheridan, anywhere, has ever fired upon a tank manned by an enemy. If it had, any kill would be the most reported and exalted tank battle since Michael Wittman.
If it had the 152mm HEAT round would have dealt a death blow. At Graf one year, there were three "new" M47 hulks down range for us to fire service HEAT. By the time we rolled off the range they were nothing but piles of metallic dust.
 
If it had the 152mm HEAT round would have dealt a death blow. At Graf one year, there were three "new" M47 hulks down range for us to fire service HEAT. By the time we rolled off the range they were nothing but piles of metallic dust.
One Iraqi M59 (Chinese-produced T-54) was reported destroyed, with the MGM-51 Shillelagh.
 
One Iraqi M59 (Chinese-produced T-54) was reported destroyed, with the MGM-51 Shillelagh.
In the absence of any valid documentation I simply do not believe such a report. It would have been the most publicized tank kill since WWII, though it would have had no impact on the vehicle generally as they were being pulled from regular service by the '80's (apart from the 37th AR). I have some very extensive digitized files from the Patton Museum prior to BRAC. Nothing like that in there.
 
If it had the 152mm HEAT round would have dealt a death blow. At Graf one year, there were three "new" M47 hulks down range for us to fire service HEAT. By the time we rolled off the range they were nothing but piles of metallic dust.
It took a very long time to address the issues of "premature detonation" of the XM409 HEAT round. And there were two types of PD failure....in-tube and just beyond the muzzle. The were repeated appeals from Combat Dev. Cmd. to not field it with HEAT. The probability of "catastrophic failure" went up exponentially with HEAT & CDC advocated that if it was fielded, a letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff-U.S. Army should be sent noting the risks to crews in fielding it. This was WITHOUT the combustible case issue.
The ultimate irony was that, at the same time as "two box" Sheridans were being fielded to Vietnam without missile capability, perhaps Sheridans going elsewhere (Germany) be ONLY Shillelagh-capable and no HEAT round fielded.
Think about what that says.
 
It took a very long time to address the issues of "premature detonation" of the XM409 HEAT round. And there were two types of PD failure....in-tube and just beyond the muzzle. The were repeated appeals from Combat Dev. Cmd. to not field it with HEAT. The probability of "catastrophic failure" went up exponentially with HEAT & CDC advocated that if it was fielded, a letter to the Deputy Chief of Staff-U.S. Army should be sent noting the risks to crews in fielding it. This was WITHOUT the combustible case issue.
The ultimate irony was that, at the same time as "two box" Sheridans were being fielded to Vietnam without missile capability, perhaps Sheridans going elsewhere (Germany) be ONLY Shillelagh-capable and no HEAT round fielded.
Think about what that says.
I know what that says. It's just another indicator that the brainiacs were infatuated with missiles. But then again that crowd was always mesmerized by silver bullet solutions. MBT-70 was an example of carrying forward of the missile is all syndrome. The line leadership was so grateful we and the Germans pulled out of that mess.
g
 
Saying whether something is valid or not is subjective, especially when one only provides an opinion.
 
I know what that says. It's just another indicator that the brainiacs were infatuated with missiles. But then again that crowd was always mesmerized by silver bullet solutions. MBT-70 was an example of carrying forward of the missile is all syndrome. The line leadership was so grateful we and the Germans pulled out of that mess.
g
The reports that precipitated the near-mystic belief in guided missilery, "ARCOVE" and "Mobility, Firepower & Protection" fairly gushed with fanboy language extolling the virtues of this solution. It was also an attempt to leapfrog technology rather than the typical measure/counter-measure solutions. There was a "Manhattan Project" mentality about it.
Sadly, Redstone Arsenal & Missile Command (MICOM) took their advocacy to unethical levels in "reporting" performance. Further to that, the Shillelagh program had the most convoluted & confusing series of managing organizations that it defied a comprehensible explanation. This is documented in some of the most cryptic language that even the Redstone historians had difficulty putting into words. "History of the Shillelagh Missile System 1958-1982" by DeLong, et. al is sadly no longer online that I can find. Fortunately I had saved it years before that happened.
When the Sheridan program was merged with Shillelagh in 1964, the fix was in.
 
Back
Top