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US Army UH-60 Blackhawk collides with PSA airliner in DC of the Potomac River.

Talyn said:
They could move the very same unit that the UH-60 was from to the DCA footprint since it's right next to the WH/Capital/govt offices that they're set-up to respond to, plus base some SAM assets there to because of the position.

In a fashion, having the incident occur over the river since both aircraft could have crashed into the developments on either side of the river.

IMO, DCAs days as a commercial airport should end.

Have the Congressional/high-level govt. officials take the public transit in from Dulles, like the serfs have to do.
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I agree. In a previous life I was flying in and out of DCA since the late 80s. When landing don't look out the windows because you'll see how close the aircraft is to the concrete barrier when it stops and turns around. If there is a weather hold, the number of planes lined up on the taxiway and the tarmac is high density traffic on the ground. Since 9-11, a Patriot Battery and/or a guided missile destroyer were tracking the approach and a pilot only had limited time to land or it was considered a threat. The field should be military use only. One other thought. If these aircraft had collided a little farther east there would have been damage on the ground at Joint Base Bolling including DIA and the AF intell Agency.
 
Cedric said:
This is very informative, I think.

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Interesting video.
1) You have 2 aircraft that ATC knows will be passing at very close proximity using visual flight rules (VFR) and you have the 2 aircraft on different frequencies??? And ATC only warned the helo ...
2) We don't have the actual ATC transcripts or audio recording but if what's in the video is all there was, the controller never told the helo that the airliner was on runway 33 final approach instead of runway 1.
3) After being told to pass behind the AA plane the helo pilot asked for instructions to clear the AA plane??? That should have been a BIG RED FLAG to controller to act NOW!
4) The helo started to climb a few hundred feet probably thinking he was clear of the aircraft that he could see, the next aircraft to land after the AA plane which was on approach to runway 1, which was straight in front of him and going to easily miss to his right, not knowing the AA plane was coming at him from his above left.

I grew up in that area and pilots have been taking the quick deviation to runway 33 since that airport was built. There is a lot of traffic but it's been done safely for many years. It allows them to land more planes in the same amount of time. But this night there does appear to be a complete breakdown of the communications to both the aircraft letting them know where each other was, especially since they were on different frequencies. That's all on the controller. Had the airliner even knew the helo was there he could of at least been leaning forward in the cabin trying to look down for him.

Sorry for ranting but this accident just upsets me pretty bad. If the aircraft can't be talking with or hear each other but only with ATC, then it is 100% the controller's job to keep them separated.
 
The News has reported that Investigators have found conflicting altimeter readings from the control tower data of the Black Hawk military helicopter and the passenger jet that collided over Washington on Jan. 29.

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) officials told reporters on Feb. 1 that preliminary altimeter data do not match the events on the night of the deadly accident.

Officials said the control tower recorded the Black Hawk helicopter flying at an altitude of 200 feet at the time of the collision, in line with its maximum allowed altitude for its flight path.

However, data from the passenger jet’s flight recorder show the collision occurred at an altitude of about 325 feet, plus or minus 25 feet.

“That’s what our job is, to figure that out,” NTSB member J. Todd Inman said during an evening news conference on Feb. 1.

Investigators hope to reconcile the altitude differences with data from the helicopter’s black box, which is taking more time to retrieve because it became waterlogged after it plunged into the Potomac River. They also said they plan to refine the tower data, which can be less reliable.

The NTSB also detailed the last moments from the jet’s two black boxes according to Brice Banning, NTSB investigator in charge.

“The crew had a verbal reaction,” Banning said. One data recorder of sound from the cockpit indicated “the airplane beginning to increase its pitch,” he said.

“Sounds of impact were audible about one second later, followed by the end of the recording.”

The other black box captured flight data from the jet.
 
Keystone19250 said:
So after removing the Black Hawk from the river initial reports are that a proximity detection system on the helicopter was turned off.
Not good if true.
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Reported in the very first post.

They (ATC, etc.) can tell if the transponder has been turn on or off when an aircraft is in sight.
 
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Keystone19250 said:
So after removing the Black Hawk from the river initial reports are that a proximity detection system on the helicopter was turned off.
Not good if true.
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Many pilots have explained that its turned off because it would detect all the other aircraft on the ground close by and other such items. Its gets turned on a lot after they climb out
 
More info...


NTSB findings on the DC midair collision:

The helo was on a night training flight, and it's believed NVG were in use. The pilot and instructor disagreed about altitude. Pilot said 300 feet and instructor said 400 feet. It's not clear why they didn't agree.

Instructor told the pilot to reduce altitude. Pilot acknowledged and began descending, calling out 300 feet, 30 seconds before impact.

The ATC advisement that the CRJ was circling towards them, was not audible in the helicopter cockpit. 20 seconds before impact ATC asked if they had the CRJ in sight. They acknowledged, and a traffic conflict alert is audible in the cockpit.

The CRJ received a TCAS alert, but avoidance instructions are disabled below 1000 feet. The CRJ continued their approach but queried ATC, who then 17 seconds before impact, advised the helo to pass behind the CRJ.

The first half of that message was obscured in the helo cockpit because of simultaneous traffic (microphone was keyed). The instructor believed they were being requested to turn left, and relayed that to the pilot, who turned into the path of the CRJ.

At impact, the CRJ was at 315 feet and the helo was at 278 feet, but both altitudes have a margin of error. The displayed altitude in the helo cockpit may have been different, based on the prior disagreement, but that is uncertain.

The CRJ attempted a full nose up maneuver just before impact. The helo was equipped with ADSB but it was turned off.
 
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